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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing discussion on defense acquisition reform 
by addressing acquisition reform at the project level—where projects are actually managed. 
Defense acquisition program management is designed to provide sustained, intensified, and 
integrated management of the complex technological development. It consists of applying 
resources to achieve a specific technical objective; managing and coordinating 
interdependent technical and social activities; and balancing severe constraints in cost, 
schedule, and performance. Defense acquisition reform must start at the project level, as it is 
here that resources are translated into results via work processes. The intent of this effort is 
to focus on the business process level of project management. Specifically, this research 
develops a system model of defense program management office (PMO) functions with the 
goal in later research to use the model to examine defense acquisition business processes. 
This research is the first part of a three-phase longitudinal study of program office processes 
and organizational interaction that affect the basic decision-making and outcomes for defense 
programs. 
Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing discussion on defense 
acquisition reform by addressing acquisition reform at the project level—where projects are 
actually managed. Defense acquisition program management is designed to provide 
sustained, intensified, and integrated management of the complex technological 
development (Butler, 1973). It consists of applying resources to achieve a specific technical 
objective; managing and coordinating interdependent technical and social activities; and 
balancing severe constraints in cost, schedule, and performance (Butler, 1973). Defense 
acquisition reform must start at the project level, as it is here that resources are translated 
into results via work processes. The intent of this effort is to focus on the business process 
level of project management. Specifically, this research is designed to develop a system 
model of defense program management office (PMO) functions with the goal in later 
research to use the model to examine defense acquisition business processes. 
Defense acquisition reform generally focuses on issues such as requirements creep, 
contractor inefficiency, and budget cuts. Apart from a recent Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report that found the information requirements of higher headquarters can add 
as much as two years of work to a weapons systems development program, there is little 
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academic research to examine potential root cause issues that may reside within the day to 
day interactions and decision-making processes within the PMO and stakeholder 
organizations (GAO, 2015). The reality is the practice of project management itself is an 
already complex process—even before the weapons system to be developed is introduced 
(Burgess, Byrne, & Kidd, 2003). 
For the purposes of this paper, a process is defined as a network of activities that 
converts inputs to outputs—in other words, a system (Giachetti, 2010). The inputs vary and 
include hard management data such as budgets, technical updates, and production status. 
The inputs also take the form of inquiries for information from the technical disciplines, the 
acquisition hierarchy, and stakeholders. Outputs include both physical and mental products, 
(e.g., ultimately components of a weapons system) as well as decisions produced by the 
mechanics of the process. The process describes what goes on between input and output. 
Processes are further decomposed into activities and tasks (Giachetti, 2010). The focus of 
this study is at the process level. Outputs of processes lead to activities that potentially 
define decisions and directions of the PMO. Process measures include quality, efficiency, 
effectiveness, profitability and innovation. 
In addition to defining the fundamental information requirements and processes in 
program environment, an examination of the model program managers (PMs) use to frame 
their decision-making is necessary. Department of Defense (DoD) program managers 
receive the same level of training as required by the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) and have similar backgrounds and experiences when they 
assume the responsibilities of program management. In order to understand and influence 
program outcomes, not only must we characterize the formal and informal processes within 
a program, but we also need to understand the environment in which a program manager 
makes decisions. Asking PMs to be innovative and holding them more accountable, as 
articulated in Better Buying Power 3.0, requires us to understand the information-driven 
decision-making environment within which the program manager operates. 
The requirements of project management have changed paralleling the exponential 
growth in technology since World War II, a corresponding increase in weapons systems 
complexity, and the vagaries of the acquisition system. Project management represents and 
is meant to manage change and assumes a structured and stable environment. While cost, 
schedule and performance are touted as the trinity of project management, cost, schedule 
and performance are metrics and constraints—the outputs of business processes—not 
project management activities. These traditional project management constraints are 
insufficient to enable and inform the management of complex, weapons/system-of-systems 
development programs.  
Background 
The DoD and the military services have wholeheartedly embraced various initiatives 
that are designed to improve overall program quality and efficiency (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2015). Many 
of these tools and processes, however, have had only marginal success, while actually 
increasing the overall process burden on program offices. Close examination of the overall 
program management process reveals that there has been fairly little change in the basic 
program management strategy and processes while significantly increasing the activity 
within these processes (Kwak et al., 2014). And the Project Management Institute has 
codified the defense acquisition program life-cycle model into a Project Managers Body of 
Knowledge (PMBOK), which further reinforces the status quo in the commercial industrial 
base. There seems to be little understanding, however, of the cause and effect relationship 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 149 - 
between the day-to-day decision-making driven by these processes and the successful 
outcome of programs. 
Incremental changes in defense acquisition over the years as a result of major 
studies have done little to change the overall trend of the ever-increasing cost to benefit 
ratio of defense programs (Fox, 2012). The volume of regulations and corresponding reports 
has increased exponentially to the number of organizational interdependencies program 
offices must manage throughout the program life cycle. Unfortunately, this increase in 
oversight has not provided a real understanding of the performance value being realized. 
Additionally, many of the feedback mechanisms and management tools within the program 
management processes provide little knowledge of program performance. While the volume 
of data on programs is significant, the interdependency of these data is lacking and often 
dated. As a result, the program manager and the Title 10 oversight authorities spend 
countless hours making decisions on desynchronized data with limited understanding of the 
program interdependencies and relevance of the data. While the intent of such data is to 
improve the overall understanding of the program and help in predicting outcomes, the 
overall effect is quite limited and in many cases actually exacerbates the very problem they 
are trying to solve. 
The Problem 
Managing any formal project in today’s world of complexity is challenging. Managing 
the development of a weapon system in the U.S. DoD can be a daunting task. The 
uncertainty associated with the maturation of the key technologies, combined with 
sometimes ambiguous and vague requirements and finding uncertainty add to the 
challenge. Structural aspects of the system, from the number of components to the detail of 
interfaces add to the task. Although the premise of project management is simple—
execution is very difficult. This basic management challenge is captured in this quote from 
Morris and Hough in 1988: 
Curiously despite the enormous attention project management and analysis 
have received over the years, the track record of projects is fundamentally 
poor, particularly for the larger and more difficult ones. Overruns are 
common. Many projects appear as failures, particularly in the public view. … 
Why does the record so consistently show project overruns to be the norm? 
Is this the indictment of project management that it seems? 
Almost 30 years later, the problems not only exist, they are becoming more 
commonplace. Although the projects examined by Morris and Hough were not exclusively 
defense projects, it seems appropriate to ask, why can’t we get defense acquisition right? 
Are the problems to be resolved at the highest levels of acquisition policy, or should we also 
examine the problems at the level of the project? This research is about applying systems 
engineering and analysis and business process reengineering to the activities and 
processes of the PMO to discover what is driving the activities of the PMO in an attempt to 
discover efficiencies that could lead to better program management effectiveness.  
The Approach 
This study is the first phase of a three-phased, multi-year effort to examine the 
processes of a program management office for efficiencies and effectiveness. Phase 1 (this 
effort) is to review the literature, identify and codify the program office process categories, 
and develop a model.  
This first phase defines the model by identifying categories of processes to frame the 
follow-on research. It is our goal to not only identify the fundamental formal and informal 
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processes within which programs are managed but also to begin to understand the 
intellectual framework within which the PM makes decisions and draw conclusions and 
recommendations that may provide insight into how to change the way PMs and 
correspondingly the PMOs think and make decisions. End state is an understanding of the 
program office activities, as well as characterization of other activities both management and 
engineering that add to and take away from the efficiency of the program office. 
Phase 2 will apply the model developed to pursue a mixed method (quantitative-
qualitative) analysis of the business processes. Our method of inquiry is intended to 
investigate the challenges associated with managing a major defense program office in the 
execution of a program of record. We intend to draw directly upon the experiences of 
program office personnel as well as external stakeholders that have a role in the overall 
defense acquisition process as defined in DoD 5000.02. While it is important to better 
understand the interactions and decision-making that occurs within a program office, the 
dependent nature of external organizations as they relate to program decision-making is 
critical to the overall understanding and sense making of program performance. 
This will be a longitudinal study in which we conduct surveys of leadership and 
program office personnel as well as stakeholder personnel within the DoD acquisition 
environment. We will also conduct interviews of a broad number of individuals, both at 
senior leadership and subordinate positions. Some potential questions will assess the 
relative efficiency of program office personnel and can be described by the following: 
1. What percentage of time is spent on external rather than internal program 
issues?  
2. What portion of that time is spent addressing programmatic issues as 
opposed to external stakeholder issues?  
3. How much time is spent internally on managing the specifics of an individual 
program? 
4. What is the direct value of the activities at the various program levels and 
can they be traced to program performance 
5. How do the current program reporting and management and control 
requirements impact program performance and what is the overall value of 
these requirements to the Defense procurement enterprise. 
6. How effective are the current business and systems engineering process in 
predicting the outcome of program performance. 
At this point in the research, these are only sample areas of interest. A qualitative 
investigation will evolve following the grounded theory methods articulated by Glaser and 
Straus (Glaser, 1978). The inquiry will likely lead in various directions and will begin to 
become or be obvious once we begin our initial coding and category development. We 
intend to use the data to identify a logical path in which we will begin to observe patterns 
and themes from which we can begin developing theory that addresses the fundamental 
question. 
Survey of the Literature 
The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—
often, indeed, to the decider himself. —John F. Kennedy (Allison, 1971) 
Decisions relating to resources and information are the outcomes of the project 
management processes. These decisions equate to the execution of a project. In defense 
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project management, this Kennedy quote rings true, as decisions made often defy analysis, 
as they are opaque. 
This survey explores project management decision-making and change through 
management science, project management science, and systems engineering and 
reengineering. Included in this section is a discussion of the project management 
environment and how the environment can influence process. This theoretical background 
provides the qualitative and quantitative basis for the research. This initial section is followed 
by a discussion of systems thinking, the systems approach, and ultimately the tie to systems 
engineering. An understanding of systems is essential to appreciate the activities of the 
business process, specifically the input and output relationships of the tasks and activities of 
that business process. The final step is a discussion of process modeling, followed by a 
proposed identification of process categories that will provide the framework for follow-on 
research. 
While formal study of project management has accelerated over the past 30 years, 
some charge that the scholarly study of the broad field of project management has diverged 
from the realities of the practice of project management (Holmquist, 2007; Payne, 1995; 
Winter & Smith, 2006). In fact, recent studies note not only complaints from practitioners for 
lack of relevance, but also questions on the value of the PMBOK (Winter et al., 2006). A 
fundamental conviction of this research is that the defense project management 
environment has radically changed, and project management and decision science and 
practice has not kept pace (Winter et al., 2006). 
Research in project management is ongoing. Study of public works projects, one of 
the first disciplines to adapt project management, is a good example. In many cases, 
research there seems to be more willing to consider breaking from the cost, schedule, and 
performance models by examining other variables. Specifically, government agencies 
dealing with the development of major infrastructure projects have found that a simple 
adherence to the principles of cost, schedule, and performance are insufficient to provide 
the necessary control of projects. For example, Owens et al. (2011) found that beyond cost 
schedule and performance, an appreciation of the details of financing, and the context of the 
project are essential elements for successful control. 
Similarly, systems thinking and its application to management have received great 
attention. Early studies emphasized the importance of defining management as a systems 
activity (Jenkins & Youle, 1968; Johnson, Kast, & Rosenzweig, 1964; Snyder, 1987; 
Sterman, 1996). More recently, the continued development of systems engineering as 
discipline has fostered a renewed interest in applying systems thinking and systems 
engineering principles to management problems (Checkland, 1994; Jackson, 2000; Sage & 
Cuppan, 2001; Sage & Rouse, 2009). A systems approach to project management would 
complement the increased emphasis of systems engineering and weapon systems 
development. Key to this idea is that system engineering management of the technical 
aspects of development should be mirrored by a systems approach in the management of 
that technical effort (Feigenbaum & Sasieni, 1968).  
The management science discipline has sought to quantify the activities of the 
various management disciplines, including project management. Tishler observed that in 
order to identify the managerial factors (and by extension the processes leading to those 
factors), success must be defined (Tishler et al., 1996). He further cited research by Pinto 
that definitions of success change during different phases of the lifecycle (Pinto & Slevin, 
1998). This suggests that the rigid adherence to cost, schedule, and performance as 
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indicators of success (and the hallmark of defense project management) alone does not 
reflect the totality of success in project management. 
A constant theme in the management science literature is the criticality of addressing 
project complexity. We discuss project complexity below however, it is important to 
recognize that managerial and technical complexity, coupled with the limits of human 
capability, has resulted in managerial and technical specialization. The specialists are 
experts in their particular field, but that local, limited knowledge of the field precludes 
identifying potentially optimal solutions to interdependent program problems (Amaral & Uzzi, 
2007). Specialization has a limiting function, in that the specialists in a PMO are measured 
by, and capable of addressing only those issues in their specific area. This suggests that 
requests for information or expertise outside specialist’s area may have a debilitating effect 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of the PMO. 
Decision-Making 
Decision-making is the essence of project management. Effective decision-making 
varies depending on the nature of the internal formal and informal processes. Eisenhardt 
(1989) noted that more information, considered simultaneously and in an integrated manner, 
led to better more productive decisions. Lack of integration in the decision-making process 
tends to keep decision-making at an abstract level, creating anxiety among the decision-
makers. Key differentiators between effective teams and less productive teams is the ability 
to stay focused on the decision outcome rather than procrastinate and wait for a time-
dependent resolution.  
Another critical aspect of Eisenhardt’s (1989) research is the notion that teams that 
considered fewer options tended to overanalyze those options, thus wasting time with fewer 
permutations of potentially effective options. This bureaucratic approach resulted in the loss 
of valuable time and the inclusion of critical information in the decision-making process. 
Finally, the notion that conflict supports good and timely decision-making was deemed 
relevant only when the team instituted an effective issue resolution process. Conflict, left 
unmanaged, tended to result in further procrastination and less effective outcomes. 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) research established a model for strategic decision-making in 
high velocity environments. This model was derived from her categories and propositions 
that synthesized the relationship between information, process, speed, and performance in 
decision-making. Her model could be relevant to decision-making in a wide variety of 
disciplines and is consistent with the behavior observed and documented in the military 
decision-making process studied for many years. Decision-making in high stress combat 
environments or in the management of major defense acquisition programs has similar 
characteristics as those observed by Eisenhardt (1989) in her study of microelectronic 
companies and likely follow similar strategies in culminating in effective outcomes. 
The notion that overanalysis of a problem, as is often the case in bureaucratic 
institutions such as the DoD, would be a useful basis to study the decision-making process 
within the DoD and its relationship to outcomes in areas such as defense procurement is 
intriguing in light of the most recent GAO (2015) report. Additional research, focusing on 
decision-making in complex environments, includes findings which argue that a high level of 
comprehensiveness slows the strategic decision process, advocate speed of decision-
making is essential, and who argue that conflict in decision-making tends to slow the 
decision-making process (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 
1976; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). 
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Systems 
Systems engineering provides proven methodologies to analyze and define the 
management function. In fact, as analytical process, systems engineering decomposes 
system problems into component parts to provide for optimal solution. In the case of 
program business functions, these analytical steps include a quantitative evaluation of the 
relationships and interactions among and between the key variables in the program office, 
manpower, information systems, and stakeholders and their interdependencies.  
The systems engineering principle of decomposition provides a methodological 
process to not only identify, but also measure the inputs, the time and cost associated with 
the process itself, and the outputs. For the same reason systems engineering uses 
requirements traceability to ensure adherence to system requirements, the analytical 
process provides a means of comparing business process outputs to both the inputs, as well 
as measuring those outputs in terms of efficiencies and effectiveness. 
Systems engineering supports the development and maintenance of good design. 
That design leads to a design decision in weapon systems development. In this analysis of 
program office business processes, we anticipate that instead of a technical design decision 
we should be able to identify either an improved design for the flow of information, or a 
decision to ignore or request relief from the inputs—those requests for information whether 
ad hoc, or driven by regulation. The result of this analysis could be an improved design for 
the flow of information within the management function of the PMO. The emphasis of the 
management work needs to be on the management system, rather than the piece parts and 
daily responses typical of the PMO workday. In essence, we are suggesting that the PM 
become the chief systems engineer of the PMO. 
Business Process Reengineering 
Business processes came to popular attention with the Hammer and Champy book, 
Reengineering the Corporation, in 1993. Although seen as revolutionary in the 1990s, the 
idea of looking at business processes dates as far back as the 19th century. In fact, the 
concept of work improvement is an almost universal pursuit that can be traced to the current 
day management theorists from those original thinkers of the 19th century including Taylor 
(1974) and Fayol (1949). The knowledge intensive workplace of today requires 
understanding across functional areas (Tétard, 1999). Since the 1990s, process modeling 
has become a basic principle of organizing a business (Aguilar-Saven, 2004). Thus, in the 
PMO of today, the demand for data results in managers performing worker tasks to feed 
higher-level managers, while their own work of supervising weapons development suffers.  
Reengineering focuses on responsiveness. Responsiveness, providing the correct 
and timely information and decisions needed for the effective management of a project, is 
achieved by the efficient and effective employment of knowledge, leadership, and 
empowered people to address everyday issues (Sage & Rouse, 2009).  
From an engineering perspective, an organization functions on three levels, the 
systems management level, the process level, and the product level (Sage & Rouse, 2009). 
In defense acquisition, the systems management level is where the majority of research, 
and potential solutions have been focused. The second level, that of process, is where this 
research is focused. The product level focuses on manufacturing and technical engineering 
functions and is not addressed. A challenge with process modeling, to include business 
process reengineering, is that it is normally only considered when an organization is near 
disaster. Business processes are complex. The larger and the more technologically 
advanced the outputs of the organization, the more complex the processes.  
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In order to examine process, one must be able to decompose process into the 
essential elements. Decomposition allows us to look at not only the individual activities 
within the process, but also to examine the source of the inputs, and the destination of the 
outputs. In order to provide focus to the decomposition process, we are defining process 
categories associated with defense project management. These process categories provide 
the starting point for the analysis. 
Change 
Program offices are constantly responding to direction that requires either process or 
momentum change. Momentum change refers to those things that distract individuals and 
organizations from their preplanned strategy. The individual dynamics that evolve in these 
types of disruptions may have an impact on organizational synergy and could lead to 
various forms of conflict. Previous research was done in this area by Kellogg (2009) in her 
study of surgery residents and the conflicts that arose within the hospital when the 
government mandated less work hours for new interns. 
Kellogg conducted a 15-month ethnographic study of two hospitals that were 
attempting to implement changes resulting from new regulations focused on reducing the 
amount of time an intern was required to work during the week. She argued that her 
observations led her to three key findings in the field of organizational movement that 
suggest that change can occur if those most interested in change are able to create an 
environment isolated from antagonists, in which they can form alliances and strategies 
necessary to realize the change. She created new terms for these findings such as 
relational spaces, relational efficacy, relational identity, and relational frames to characterize 
her findings. 
Kellogg studied the behavior of staff and interns at two seemingly similar teaching 
hospitals as the hospital directors attempted to implement work hour change for the interns. 
The motivation of the directors was twofold. First was their concern of maintaining 
accreditation, and second was their desire to attract a larger body of candidates for their 
program. There appeared to be both defenders and resisters to the change, who she 
referred to as Defenders and Reformers. Not surprisingly, the Defenders tended to include 
the more senior residents and the institutional staff, and the reformers tended to include the 
interns who comprised the brunt of the long workweeks and tended to have the most to gain 
from the change. 
The relevant nature of this study suggests that similar conflicts could be resident in 
program offices by the continually changing nature of the program environment. This may 
lead to similar behaviors identified by Kellogg and could perhaps lead to potential strategies 
to improve the outcomes of an environment that is plagued with change as an inherent 
result of the acquisition process. 
PMO Process Classification 
To effectively manage a program, an understanding of the details of the business 
processes is essential. A central effort of this research is to identify the details of these 
business processes. In order to do that, and business processes need to be decomposed 
into their essential elements. 
A system is a set of interacting components that have a relationship (Marca & 
McGowan, 1988). We consider a business process a system, as it is a self-contained activity 
that converts inputs to outputs. Identifying the characteristics of the business process 
system used in the PMO is essential to understand the processes. System modeling 
provides a means to develop an accurate description of a system (Marca & McGowan, 
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1988). We use IDEF (integrated computer aided manufacturing DEFinition) methodology in 
this study to model the business processes in the PMO. 
IDEF0 is a modeling technique that captures relationships, interdependencies, 
functions and interfaces methodology for modeling (Presley, 1995). IDEF is used to create 
activity models and establish interrelationships among inputs, controls outputs, and 
mechanisms (ICOM) of the business processes (Vernadat, 1996). Arrows represent inputs 
(I), controls (C), outputs (O), and mechanisms (M). Figure 1 shows the “IDEF Box” and the 
functions that are captured, and the ICOM taxonomy. 
 
 IDEF Methodology  
Process Elements 
Using an enterprise systems engineering model developed by Saenz (2005), we 
have identified three major process classes, organized into a hierarchy. Organized from 
lower to higher, the first process class is the process element level. The process element 
level consists of work, resources, information, and decisions. 
The second level moves beyond the actual work performed and includes process 
categories that impact on the business processes. The process categories include capacity, 
conflict, context, and complexity. These categories are more difficult to measure in an 
engineering sense; therefore, a combination of quantitative and qualitative research must be 
used. 
The top level of the hierarchy is where the metrics are defined. This top level 
includes measures of cost, schedule, quality, and a measure of the benefit that the 
processes as well as the outputs the processes bring to the organization. 
The first, process element is the lowest level and is where the actual work is 
accomplished. The process element level includes work, resources, and information that 
lead to the decisions that impact the management of the program. In the PMO model, inputs 
are the activities that require an action from the PMO. Those activities include reports, 
information, and decisions that must be addressed. Controls regulate the function and 
include constraints such as time and budget. Outputs represent the result of the combination 
of inputs controls and the mechanism that represent the resources that actually do the work. 
In the PMO, outputs include decisions, as well as materials including budget and 
engineering reports, and replies to requests from stakeholders for information. In many 
cases the outputs of one process become inputs to another. Mechanisms are the physical 
resources needed to perform the work, and for purposes of this research include PMO 
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personnel, and the resources they need to accomplish their mission. Figure 2 shows the 
IDEF methodology applied to the process element level, where the work is actually being 
performed. 
 
 IDEF Applied to the PMO Process Element Level 
Process Categories 
The second level of the proposed hierarchy is that of process categories. Process 
categories influence the accomplishment of the work and are essential to understand the 
efficiencies of the process. Payne (1995) suggested project management activities can be 
divided into categories including capacity, complexity, conflict, and context. Payne 
developed these categories in the context of managing multiple simultaneous projects. 
However, these categories are appropriate for measuring PMO processes as they cover the 
range of activities in any PMO. Figure 3 shows the process categories and their relationship 
to the element level. 
Capacity/Scope 
Capacity (or scope) is a measure of the amount of work that can be performed by the 
PMO. In the PMO, the number of people times their available work time represents capacity. 
In industry, capacity and the necessary scaling (elasticity) is addressed through hiring, 
reassigning, and releasing people, as well as using tools like overtime. In the government, 
hiring and firing to meet capacity needs is not feasible. And for the most part, the personnel 
needed to address increases in PMO scope are not eligible for overtime. Therefore, in any 
PMO, attaining required capacity is met either by providing capacity organically or 
subcontracting training activities to a commercial provider. The degree of subcontracting will 
be another process measure. Over a specific time period, capacity refers to the amount and 
type of work to be done, decisions to be made, resources needed to perform productive and 
managerial work; and the amount and types of information required (Saenz, 2005, p. 104). 
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 PMO Process Categories in an IDEF Model of PMO Process Elements 
Capacity is measured in terms of the numbers of actions, processes, activities, and 
tasks of the PMO and is applied across resources and information. The output of capacity is 
an inventory of process capability measured at the PMO level. Capacity is a measure of 
system potential. As in weapons systems engineering, capacity must be measured and 
managed, and provides the framework to identify the elasticity necessary to address 
downsizing and surging. Capacity and the elasticity necessary to address surging is a 
critical, but often-unaddressed process factor. 
Capacity/Scope is also a measure of the capacity or magnitude of the PMO activities 
necessary for success. In resource constrained environments, the details of scope provide 
the necessary information at the PMO level to make appropriate decisions on what can and 
cannot be addressed. Similar to systems engineering, including scope adds realism to the 
specification process. 
This research approach to the project management environment is critical because 
while a project may appear to be operating in an efficient manner and may even be at less 
than full capacity with regard to level of effort, it is the process by which the team makes 
decisions at the various levels of capacity that will have an impact on the overall program 
performance outcomes. Capacity is a central process category. 
Conflict  
Conflict describes the actual management of the development of the system and is 
related to the balances and choices made. Conflict is divided into three parts, people, 
system, and organization (Payne, 1995). By far, the most important part of project 
management conflict is that associated with people.  
The people aspect of conflict starts at the PM level. The PM is assigned a group of 
people on a temporary basis—a matrix organization. PMOs are purpose-built temporary 
organizations that consist of people with different loyalties and different masters. The first 
element of conflict is the fact the PM for the most part has limited control of the entire PMO. 
A second major element of conflict is change. Projects are about change, but change is 
anathema to most people.  
System conflict is expressed as the balance of priority. At the PMO level, priority is 
established by stakeholders and decided by the PM. However, as in any activity, priority 
shifts based on actual events. At the process level, priority is expressed as what activities 
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get done in what sequence. For this analysis, examination of priorities is central to 
understanding the outputs of the process as different management levels have different 
impacts on the establishment and the execution of priorities. 
Organization conflicts arise from the stakeholder approach to project management. 
Higher-level organizations set priorities that may or may not match those of the PMO. 
Similarly, the matrix support organizations (i.e., engineering) are tasked with providing 
support to different projects. How those leaders decide to allocate their resources impacts 
the success of the project, as well as the execution of the process. 
Context  
Context is the ecosystem of the PMO and the project. From a systems perspective, 
context needs to be viewed from the perspective of all stakeholders (Owens et al., 2011). 
Context includes the politics of the stakeholder community, the political environment, 
resource availability, and force majeure. 
Context includes those PMO activities that are essential to administer programs, but 
are not directly related to the management of the development/ or manufacture. Context 
ranges from tracking budget requests through the bureaucracy to responding to legislative 
branch oversight, as well as the myriad non-program training requirements dictated by DoD 
and the U.S. government. A recurring theme in this category is the necessity of 
interorganizational and interpersonal communication. While a known factor, this 
communication causes considerable work not directly related to managing technical 
development. 
The politics of the stakeholder community is by far the most powerful factor in the 
category of context. Whenever people are put in an organization and asked to function as a 
team, there is an inevitable use of power and political behavior (Pinto, 2000). 
Notwithstanding a general distaste for political behavior in DoD activities, the reality is the 
practice of politics is a prime force in defense acquisition. Political behavior is the process by 
which individuals and groups seek, acquire, and maintain power (Pinto, 2000). 
Complexity 
Complexity refers to those activities concerned with the interfaces between the 
project management organization, the technical staff, stakeholders, and others. Complexity 
as a measure of military weapons systems has been detailed by Sapolsky (1972), Hughes 
(2011), Gholz, and others (Sage & Rouse, 2009). Systems engineering was developed in 
part to address the engineering aspects of complexity in the development of weapons 
systems (Kossiakoff et al., 2011). While continuing to evolve, systems engineering has for 
the most part been able to address that technical complexity—indeed, a hallmark of systems 
engineering is its ability to provide a mechanism to address complexity (Hall, 1962).  
Complexity has a direct effect on the ability of the PMO to deal with management 
and decision issues as the more complex the system, the potentially more complex the 
management and decisions necessary. Moreover, the mixture of human-socio-political 
complexity found in program management offices demands a closer look at how systems 
engineering and the behavior and management sciences can together address these 
problems.  
Definitions and explanations of complexity abound, from Williams (2008) to Gell-
Mann (1995), to Holland (1993), to Hughes (2011). Rather than select a specific definition, 
and to allow for a more complete analysis, the complexity framework developed by Sheard 
and Mostashari (2009) is adapted to illustrate project management complexity. The 
framework includes a topology of different kinds of structural complexity, two kinds of 
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dynamic complexity and socio-political complexity (Sheard & Mostashari, 2009). Table 1 
captures the framework and provides examples of its application to defense program 
management. 
Structural complexity includes the size of the acquisition system while focusing on 
the connectivity of the parts of the system and its hierarchy (Williams, 2008). For purposes 
of the defense project management system, structural complexity also includes the civilian 
and military hierarchy and the connectivity between higher and lower level commands, and 
program offices. The number staff actions between these organizations is significant and 
includes both issues relating to managing ongoing development, as well as issues 
discussed above of conflict, context, and capacity. 
Beyond the hierarchies, PMOs are major business entities directly controlling 
budgeting, spending, and in most cases the award of fee to defense companies. PMOs are 
spread throughout the United States and overseas, and organized into military-type 
hierarchical organizations. The architecture aspect of structural complexity is also influenced 
by the nature of defense acquisition. Since the technology development infrastructure (i.e., 
laboratories, R&D centers, and manufacturing) is for most part privately owned, structural 
complexity also describes the network connectivity necessary for the system to function. 
 Project Management Complexity 
 
Sheard and Mostashari (2009) divided dynamic complexity into short and long term. 
In the case of project management, unpredictability and uncertainty is common. Whether it 
is a tactical response to a development problem, or an administrative response to directives, 
the project management system is in constant flux.  
The unpredictability arises from the diverse and always changing aspects of ongoing 
development. Each individual (the human element) will interpret and emphasize different 
aspects of the problem and how to address that problem. This has potentially significant 
impact on the management system unless this unpredictability can be mitigated. In other 
words, the interdependency is severed, and PMO are reduced to experience-driven survival 
skills rather than the approved PMO processes. 
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Uncertainty also stems for the military rotation policy where senior leaders change 
jobs approximately every two to three years. Most new leaders are driven to make a mark 
on the organization and may be therefore unwittingly contributing to the uncertainty of the 
staff. This constant change has two main effects. The first is a focus on the short-term. What 
can one do in the next 12 to 24 months that will make a difference and further a career? 
This constant change also affects the technical staff. Uncertainty is reflected in another 
complexity factor, socio-political (Maier, 1995). It is this area where the nexus between 
management, and the non-engineering human factors of policy, process, and practice of the 
system is most critical. 
 
 PMO Process Model  
The last aspect of complexity in the context of program management is 
interdependence. When different systems interact, there are two results. The first is the 
cumulative effect of the interaction (Rebovich, 2008). For the PMO, the interdependencies 
between those managing the development and those executing the development should 
result in repeatable, consistent results—continued progress in system development. 
However, when the link between those managing and those executing is broken, or as can 
happen, ignored, the interdependency is broken. Consideration and appreciation of the 
effects of complexity is critical for any examination of the defense PMO. Complexity drives 
the necessity for a systems approach to project management. 
Value 
The final process category is Value. Value includes the well-known measures of cost 
and schedule, but adds measures of quality and benefit. Each process consists of a flow of 
mental and physical activity and information. These flows include the resources, equipment, 
people, and the decision essential for success. These flows drive decision-making both for 
execution and to inform future decisions on resource allocation. Figure 4 shows the 
complete model. 
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These flows also define the core competency of the PMO as demonstrated at the 
element level. The result of this process implementation is alignment of the work processes 
of the PMO. Those processes are then reconciled with the support elements of the 
enterprise (HR, Finance, Engineering, Quality, etc.). 
Conclusion 
This paper develops a process model to identify and define the PMO processes to 
model the activities of a program management office. The process model described in this 
paper provides the framework for the phase of this research that is to perform a field study 
of PMO processes. The model depicted in Figure 4 is the model that will be used in the 
Phase 2 research using both quantitative and qualitative techniques. This research will be a 
multi-phased longitudinal study of program office processes and organizational interaction 
that affect the basic decision-making and outcomes for defense programs.  
The mixed methods approach may provide novel insight into underlying issues that 
impact the overall program performance. This unique study combines both systems 
engineering rigor and humanistic behavior as it relates to program outcomes and ultimately 
may provide a perspective on the how value is derived from defense programs. 
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